Honduras: A Pariah State, or Innovative Solutions to Organized Crime Deserving U.S. Support?

Since his election in 2013, Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernandez has made significant changes in the strategy and institutions of the country in combating the interrelated scourges of organized crime and violent gangs, which have prejudiced Honduras as well as its neighbors. Principal among these are the creation of a new inter-agency structure, de la Fuerza de Seguridad Interinstitucional Nacional (the National Inter-Agency Security Force [FUSINA]), integrating the military, police, prosecutors, special judges, and other state resources to combat organized crime and delinquency in the country. More controversially, he has created a new police force within the military, the Policía Militar del Orden Público (Military Police of Public Order [PMOP]), which has been deployed both to provide security to the nation’s principal urban areas, Tegucigalpa, Comayagüela and San Pedro Sula, and to participate in operations against organized crime groups. In the fight against narcotrafficking, he has advanced a concept of three interdependent “shields”: 1). An air shield to better control Honduran airspace, enabled by January 2014 enabling the shoot-down of suspected drug flights and the acquisition of three radars from Israel to support intercepts by the Honduran air force; 2). A maritime shield, with new naval bases on the country’s eastern coast, and new shallow-water and riverine assets for intercepting smugglers; and, 3). A land shield, including enhanced control of the border with Guatemala through the Task Force “Maya Chorti.” Beyond FUSINA, the Hernandez administration has also sought to reform the nation’s national police, albeit with slow progress. It is also reforming the penitentiary system, dominated by the criminal gangs MS-13 and B-18. The new security policies of the Hernandez administration against transnational organized crime and the gang threat, set forth in its Inter-Agency Security Plan and “OPERATION MORAZÁN,” have produced notable successes. With U.S. assistance, FUSINA and the Honduran government dismantled the leadership of the nation’s two principal family-based drug smuggling organizations, the Cachiros and the Los Valles, and significantly reduced the use of the national territory as a drug transit zone, particularly narco flights. Murders in the country have fallen from 86.5 per 100,000 in 2011, to 64 per 100,000 in 2014. This monograph focuses on the evolution of the transnational organized crime and gang challenges in Honduras, the strategy and structures of the Hernandez administration in combating them, associated challenges, and provides recommendations for the U.S. military and policymakers to support the country in such efforts.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1421/thumbnail.jp

Indian and Chinese Engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Comparative Assessment

This monograph comparatively examines the content and country focus of high-level diplomacy for each of the two actors, as well as the volume and patterns of trade, the activities of Indian and Chinese companies in the region, and their relationship to their respective governments in eight sectors: (1) petroleum and mining; (2) agriculture; (3) construction; (4) manufacturing and retail; (5) banking and finance; (6) logistics and port operations; (7) technology such as telecommunications, space, and high technology; and, (8) military sales and activities. This monograph finds that Indian engagement with the region is significantly less than that of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and concentrated on a more limited subset of countries and sectors. In the commercial and military sector, it finds that the efforts by the Indian government to support their companies in the region are generally more modest and less coordinated than those of the PRC. Nonetheless, despite such limitations, the nature of Indian companies and their engagement with the region create opportunities for significant advances in the future, in a manner that is relatively well received by Latin American governments and societies.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1415/thumbnail.jp

The New Russian Engagement with Latin America: Strategic Position, Commerce, and Dreams of the Past

In many ways, Russia’s expanded engagement in Latin America as a response to escalating tension over the Ukraine was a repetition of its answer to U.S. involvement in the 2008 conflict in the former Soviet Republic of Georgia. In the latter conflict, the U.S. deployed naval forces to the Black Sea in response to Russian support for the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia countered with a series of actions in Latin America, including sending nuclear-capable Tu-160 bombers to Venezuela, from where they conducted symbolically-charged flights around the Caribbean. A month later, a four-ship Russian naval flotilla deployed to the area to conduct military exercises with the Venezuelan navy before making port calls in Cuba and Nicaragua. In November 2008, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev traveled to Latin America to participate in the leadership summit of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, then subsequently hosted both Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega in Moscow. Three months later, Bolivian President Evo Morales also traveled to Russia, followed in November 2009 by Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa. Very little beyond journalistic accounts have been written to examine contemporary Russian activities in Latin America and the Caribbean. As Russia’s reassertion of its global position and associated tensions with the United States proceed, a broad understanding of Russia in the Americas becomes ever more important, both as a question of U.S. national security and as an important dynamic shaping the global geopolitical environment. This monograph focuses on the character of the ongoing Russian re-engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean and its implications for the U.S.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1450/thumbnail.jp

U.S. National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America

Ultimately, this monograph argues that increasing Chinese engagement with Latin America will make the nation both a powerful competitor and a potential partner for the United States in the Western Hemisphere. On one hand, China with major investments in Latin America and dependence on its material flows is likely to be a nation interested in reducing political instability, armed groups, and criminal activity in the region—rather than fueling radical populism and insurgency. On the other hand, the United States needs to consider to what degree it is willing to accept a China that has increasing leverage in its strategic neighborhood and its major trading area. Investment and trade presence leads to growing interest in the political course of the region, and now is the time for the United States to begin to consider how to constructively engage the Chinese in the Western Hemisphere.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1746/thumbnail.jp

China, Europe, and the Pandemic Recession: Beijing’s Investments and Transatlantic Security

Given the depth and breadth of the pandemic-induced recession in Europe, private companies in need of capital and governments looking to shed state-owned enterprises may be tempted to sell shares, assets, or outright ownership to investors with liquidity to spare. Of greatest concern is the role that China might play in Europe, building Beijing’s soft power, weakening allied geopolitical solidarity, and potentially reprising the role it played in the 2010s, when its investments in Europe expanded dramatically. More specifically, there is concern over China’s investments in infrastructure and sensitive technologies relevant to American and allied military operations and capabilities. Whether Europe is prepared and able to parry Beijing’s economic statecraft is somewhat unclear, given varied attitudes toward China and the patchwork of investment screening mechanisms across the continent. Regardless, the outcomes will have significant implications for US security and for the Defense Department specifically. In support of US European Command (EUCOM) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) assembled an interdisciplinary team to examine these issues and offer actionable policy recommendations for military leaders and decisionmakers on both sides of the Atlantic. Study sponsors (nonfunding): United States European Command, United States Department of Homeland Securityhttps://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1945/thumbnail.jp

New Constraints on Cosmic Reionization from the 2012 Hubble Ultra Deep Field Campaign

Understanding cosmic reionization requires the identification and characterization of early sources of hydrogen-ionizing photons. The 2012 Hubble Ultra Deep Field (UDF12) campaign has acquired the deepest infrared images with the Wide Field Camera 3 aboard Hubble Space Telescope and, for the first time, systematically explored the galaxy population deep into the era when cosmic microwave background (CMB) data indicates reionization was underway. The UDF12 campaign thus provides the best constraints to date on the abundance, luminosity distribution, and spectral properties of early star-forming galaxies. We synthesize the new UDF12 results with the most recent constraints from CMB observations to infer redshift-dependent ultraviolet (UV) luminosity densities, reionization histories, and electron scattering optical depth evolution consistent with the available data. Under reasonable assumptions about the escape fraction of hydrogen ionizing photons and the intergalactic medium clumping factor, we find that to fully reionize the universe by redshift z~6 the population of star-forming galaxies at redshifts z~7-9 likely must extend in luminosity below the UDF12 limits to absolute UV magnitudes of M_UV\sim -13 or fainter. Moreover, low levels of star formation extending to redshifts z~15-25, as suggested by the normal UV colors of z\simeq7-8 galaxies and the smooth decline in abundance with redshift observed by UDF12 to z\simeq10, are additionally likely required to reproduce the optical depth to electron scattering inferred from CMB observations.Comment: Version accepted by ApJ (originally submitted Jan 5, 2013). The UDF12 website can be found at http://udf12.arizona.ed

Enabling a More Externally Focused and Operational PLA – 2020 PLA Conference Papers

Although the People’s Liberation Army is not yet a global expeditionary force on par with the US military, the former has nevertheless significantly expanded its ability to operate abroad. Through enhanced technological capabilities, robust relationships with foreign militaries, increased access to overseas military bases and dual-use facilities, and the implementation of major structural reforms, the People’s Liberation Army has built a more integrated joint force capable of conducting a wider and more complex array of missions. This volume advances the understanding of the People’s Liberation Army’s capability to conduct overseas missions by examining China’s military relations with Europe, Africa, and Latin America; the country’s military activities in the Indian Ocean, polar regions, and Pacific Island countries; and the emerging roles of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force and the Joint Logistic Support Force. This volume finds the People’s Liberation Army is engaged in a wide range of activities throughout the world, including port calls, joint exercises, seminars, and personnel exchanges. China sells weapons to some parts of the world and seeks to acquire military and dual-use technology from others. In addition, the People’s Liberation Army seeks to increase its capability to operate in parts of the world, such as the Indian Ocean, Pacific Island countries, and polar regions, where the organization has only had a minimal presence in the past.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1947/thumbnail.jp

The UV Luminosity Function of Star-forming Galaxies via Dropout Selection at Redshifts z ~ 7 and 8 from the 2012 Ultra Deep Field Campaign

We present a catalog of high-redshift star-forming galaxies selected to lie within the redshift range z ≃ 7-8 using the Ultra Deep Field 2012 (UDF12), the deepest near-infrared (near-IR) exposures yet taken with the Hubble Space Telescope (HST). As a result of the increased near-IR exposure time compared to previous HST imaging in this field, we probe ~0.65 (0.25) mag fainter in absolute UV magnitude, at z ~ 7 (8), which increases confidence in a measurement of the faint end slope of the galaxy luminosity function. Through a 0.7 mag deeper limit in the key F105W filter that encompasses or lies just longward of the Lyman break, we also achieve a much-refined color-color selection that balances high redshift completeness and a low expected contamination fraction. We improve the number of dropout-selected UDF sources to 47 at z ~ 7 and 27 at z ~ 8. Incorporating brighter archival and ground-based samples, we measure the z ≃ 7 UV luminosity function to an absolute magnitude limit of M_(UV) = –17 and find a faint end Schechter slope of ɑ =-1.87^(+0.18)_(-0.17). Using a similar color-color selection at z ≃ 8 that takes our newly added imaging in the F140W filter into account, and incorporating archival data from the HIPPIES and BoRG campaigns, we provide a robust estimate of the faint end slope at z ≃ 8, ɑ =-1.94^(+0.21)_(-0.24). We briefly discuss our results in the context of earlier work and that derived using the same UDF12 data but with an independent photometric redshift technique

1962: Abilene Christian College Bible Lectures - Full Text

THE RESTORATION PRINCIPLE” Being the Abilene Christian College Annual Bible Lectures 1962 Price: $3.95 Published by ABILENE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE STUDENTS EXCHANGE ACC Station Abilene, Texa